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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
GORDON BERLANT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER, Adminis-
trator of the Estates of Grant Kimball 
-31ower and Altha Mower, his wife, 
deceased, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12076 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 22, 1965, an automobile driven by 
B.Y.U. ::itudent, Gordon Berlant, collided with an automo-
bile being driven by Grant Kimball Mower on a public 
higlrway in Sanpete County, Utah. Gordon Berlant and 
one of his passengers were seriously injured and another 
of his passengers was killed. Grant Kimball Mower and 
hi~ wife, Altha Mower, who was a passenger in the Mower 
car, died of injuries received in the collision. On No-
\'PJn]wr 1, 1968, the Plaintiff, Gordon Berlant, brought 
~11it in Sanpett• County against J olm S. McAllister as 
administrator of the estate of Grant Kimball Mower to 
l'l'conr dainag0s for his injuries. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
Following service of Plaintiff's complaint, McAllister 
filed an answer and counterclaim. Berlant tendered the 
defense of the counterclaim to his liability insnrer which 
thereupon filed a reply to McAllister's counterclaim al-
leging as a defense a certain release previously procured 
by Berlant's insurer from McAllister. McAllister then 
filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court 
granted Defendant's motion and entered a summary judg-
ment of no cause of action in favor of the Defendant Mc-
Allister and against the Plaintiff and dismissed the action 
\Yi th prejudice'. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order dismissing his 
complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gordon Berlant, a resident of San Mateo, California 
(See ( R. 3), and his two passengers, Linda Richardson 
Jasperson and Marilyn Lamoreaux, all B.Y.U. students, 
were all injured in a head-on automobile collision with a 
vehicle owned and operated by Grant Mower. (R. 88) 
Berlant's liability insurer, Farmers Insurance: Exchange, 
was notified of the accident and, acting under Berlant's 
policy, effected a settlement of claims asserted for the 
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deaths of Grant Kimball Mower and Altha F. Mower in 
April of 1966 by paying Defendant, John S. McAllister, 
the administrator of the Mower estates, the sum of $5,-
150.00 and taking a release from McAllister. The settle-
ment and release was approved by the Probate Division 
of the District Court of Sanpete County. (R. 21-24, 79) 
This settlement took place although Berlant and his sur-
viving passenger, Linda Richardson J asperson, had pre-
Yionsly informed Berlant's insurer that Be'flant was on 
his own side of the road at the time of the collision. (R. 
74) The settlement was effected without Berlant's prior 
knowledge or consent. He did not participate therein and 
later, upon learning of the settlement, objected thereto. 
(R. 66, 74-75, 78) 
Some time prior to November, 1968, J. Rulon Morgan, 
of the law firm of Morgan and Payne, commenced two 
separate actions in Sanpete County on behalf of Berlant's 
passengers against Defendant, John S. McAllister. Civil 
No. 5682 was filed on behalf of Linda Richardson Jasper-
son; the other; Civil No. 5681, on behalf of Alan R. Mor-
gan as administrator of the estate of Marilyn Lamoreaux. 
Until the latter part of 1967 Berlant thought he' was also 
being represented by J. Rulon Mo·rgan. (R. 75) However, 
in the latter part of 1967 Mr. Morgan advised Berlant 
that a conflict of interest prevented such representation 
and that Berlant should contact Attorney Don Hanson, 
counsel for Berlant's liability insurer. (R. 75) Berlant 
tlitl so and was informed by Don Hanson in 1968 that the 
latter would not undertake Berlant's representation ex-
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cept to defend. (R. 75, 76) There was some discussion by 
Berlant and Mr. Morgan regarding the pos1sibility of 
settlement of t11e claims of Berlant's passengers and Ber-
lant's claims together; and prior to November 17, 1968, 
J. Rulon Morgan undertook to draft and send a form of 
complaint to Berlant which Berlant signed and filed with-
out an attorney's signature. (R. 3, 64) 
Mr. Morgan assisted Berlant in appropriately re-
sponding to a motion to quash and to a demand for the 
posting of security for costs. (See R. 4, 8, 10, 11, 13) 
McAllister thereafter filed an answer and counterclaim 
(R. 14-17) in which he pleaded the settlement as an "ac-
cord and satisfaction agreement" in his fourth defense 
and as working an estoppel in his fifth defense. The coun-
terclaim was presented to Berlant's insurer who referred 
the representation to the attorney normally handling in-
surance defense work for the company, Mr. Don Hanson. 
Mr. Hanson appeared for Berlant and filed a reply. (R. 
19-20, 79) The reply so filed pleaded the settlement and 
release as one affirmative defense. (R. 20) The order of 
the probate division of the court approving the settlement 
and form of release and a copy of the release were made 
exhibits to the reply. (R. 20-24) McAllister thereupon 
filed a motion for summary judgment urging that the 
reply which pleaded the release was a conclusive showing 
that "as a matter of law the parties entered into a conclu-
sive and binding arrangement to settle the dispute be-
tween them in April of 1966." (R. 25) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Berlant was unable to secure independent represen-
tation until after the hearing on McAllister's motion for 
summary judgment but soon thereafter employed Attor-
ney Udell R. Jensen. (R. 75, 76) Mr. Jensen had attended 
the hearing on McAllister's motion for summary judg-
ment at Berlant's request. At the hearing, all counsel 
there present apparc~ntly acquiescing, a decision was post-
voned so as to allow Berlant to find counsel and deter-
mine his position as to the reply. (R. 77) Mr. Jensen then 
eonducted a factual investigation and on SeptembPr 7, 
19G9, found two Sanpete County rPsidPnts, LaRell Lar-
~en and Reva Larsen, his wife, with knowledge of the 
facts who had not been located or interviewed by the in-
vestigating officers or Berlant's insurer even though they 
were present at the scene of the accident until the injured 
"\Vere removed. (R. 78, 83-85) The Larsens reported that 
the northhonnd Mower vehicle had passed their vehicle 
"\Vhile they "\\·ere traveling north follo\ving a snow plow 
which was casting up a great cloud of snow and that the 
collision occurred as the Mm,·er· vehicle traveled north 
on the west (wrong) side of the road and moved into the 
snow c1ond near the snow plow where it met the· sonth-
bonnd Berlant vehicle head on. (R. 83-85) 
On September 2, 1969 (five days before Udell R. Jen-
sen located the Larsen witnesses), the trial court entert>d 
an order finding that McAllister's motion for summary 
judg1nent should be granted. (R. 68-70) 
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6 
Thereafter, Berlant's attorney, Udell Jensen, filed a 
motion to vacate the order and to permit Berlant to amend 
his complaint and the reply filed by Berlant's rnsurer. 
This motion was never directly acted on. 
On March 12, 1970, the trial court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant McAllister, no cause of 
action, and dismissed the entire action with prejudice 
as to all parties. 
The position BerJant's insurance carrier concerning 
McAllister's motion, the settlement and release taken by 
it, and the effect of the reply it filed on behalf of Berlant 
which raised the release as a defense is set forth in a 
memorandum which appears in the record at pages 79 to 
81. Berlant's policy of insurance was not presented to 
the trial court and so is not a part of the record. It is a 
standard printed form policy, however. The material 
portion thereof provides that the insurer is obligated 
"to pay all damages which the insured become::; 
legally obliged to pay because of (A) bodily injury 
to any person and/or (B) damages to property 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use 
of the described automobile or a non-insured auto-
mobile, and to defend, at its expense, any suit 
against the insured for such damages; but the 
company may make such settlement of any claim 
or suit as it deems advi:;;ahlP." (R. 49) 
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Berlant's insurer contends that under the policy it 
had "a right to investigate, defend or settle any claims 
... against Berlant"; that acting pursuant to its author-
itv it settled claims made bv McAllister as adrninistra-. .
tor of the estates of Grant Kimball Mower and Altha 
Mower; that "the Plaintiff may elect to rely on and take 
advantage of the settlement which the insurance carrier 
effected; and that if he has so elected, or does so elect, 
this case should be dismissed in its entirety"; and that, in 
any event, tht• settlt>ment made discharges all of its obli-
gations under the policy so that if the action under the 
eounterelaim should proceed, it would have no obligation 
to def Pnd nor to pay any jndgnwnt a hove the amount of 
the settlement previously made. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SETTLEMENT BERLANT'S INSURER MADE WITH 
MCALLISTER AND THE RELEASE GIVEN BY MCALLIS-
TER EVIDENCING THE SAME HAVE NO APPLICATION 
TO NOR EFFECT ON BERLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST MC-
ALLISTER. 
A. The Release Does Nat Co·n.stititfe an Admission 
of Liability on the Part of Berlant in Caitsing the Acci-
dent. 
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The Plaintiff Berlant's complaint having been dis-
missed on a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff is 
entitled to have this Court view the evidence and all in-
ferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to 
him; and if it appears that Plaintiff could establish a 
right to recovery, the judgment dismissing the action 
should be set aside. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity 
& Guar. Ins. Underwriters, I·nc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 
685 (1965) and Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 
30, 395 p .2d 62 ( 1964). 
Here there is no transcript and the material facts are 
disclosed solely by the pleadings in the record. While 
certain of the physical facts concerning the cause of the 
accident itself may be disputed by the Defendant, if the 
facts as to how the accident occurred described by Berlant 
and particularly LaRell Larsen and Reva Larsen are true, 
a verdict for Plaintiff must follow. (See R. 83-85) 
This notwithstanding, the trial court dismissed Plain-
tiff's complaint on the basis of the release executed by 
Defendant McAllister obtained by Berltant's insurer in 
settling with McAllister without Berlant's knowledge and 
contrary to what Berlant had previously informed his in-
surer and which was plead by the insurer as a defense to 
McAllister's counterclaim. 
The basic issue thus presented is whether a motorist's 
liability insurance carrier compromises, settles and dis-
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('harges its insured's claims for hodily injury arising out 
of an ac('ident hy the mere process of paying a sum to the 
other party to the accident in settlement of any claims 
he might have against the insured and by procnring a 
rdcast> from such otlwr party. 
Plaintiff snh1nits that it certainly does not; that the 
insurer had no authority to do so and <lid not do so (de-
::;pitc the nwmorandum of position with contrary implica-
tions filed by the insured). (R.. 79-81) Jn thf> evt>nt it 
did do so or attempt to do so, it nrnst respond in dam-
ages to its insun•d; and in no evrnt could such a purported 
discharge hy the insurer hind Berlant undrr the nndis-
1mtrd farts of this case. 
J:>laintiff can conceive of only three theories upon 
which thf> subject release might have been held to bar 
Plaintiff's snit. First, it may hP claimed to constitute a 
conclusiye admission of causati,·e, contributory negligence 
on Plaintiff's part as a matter of law. Second, it may he 
argued that such St'ttlement was a mutual, agreed release 
of claims constituting an undertaking h)· each party not to 
sne the other for claims arising from thf> accident. Third, 
it might he the hasis for the application of the doctrine 
of promissor>· estoppel. The second and third of these 
possihilities are discnssed helow. 
As to the first possible theory of the effect of the 
re leas<> on Bt>rlant's claims, the question is: Does the re-
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10 
lease constitute a conclusive admission of causative negli-
gence on the part of the insured so as to require dismissal 
of the insured's suit against the representative of the 
Defendant~ The obvious answer is no. It is readily ap-
parent from the language of the release that there is no 
statement as to who was to blame or even that McAllister 
had a legitimate claim. It expressly provided that the 
settlement did not constitute an admission of any fault 
whatever on the part of Berlant. (R. 23-24) Thus, the 
release provides in the third paragraph that the surviving 
Mower children "may" have a cause of action against 
Berlant by reason of the claimed wrongful death of the 
Mowers. In the fifth paragraphMcAllister acknowledged 
receipt of $5,150.00 in full satisfaction of "any claims" 
\vhich the children and heirs "may" have against Berlant 
and released Berlant and his representatives from claims 
McAllister and the children and heirs "may have." In 
the sixth paragraph McAllister aclmowledged that the 
settllement was made for the purpose of making "a full 
and final compromise, adjustment and settlement of any 
and all claims, disputed or otherwise, on account of the 
deaths, injuries and damages above mentioned." The 
sole and only deaths, injuries and damages mentioned 
anywhere in the release are "the deaths of Grant Kimball 
Mower and Altha Mower, including any and all claims 
for their deaths or personal injuries and property dam-
age ... " as set forth in the last part of the fifth para-
graph and also as mentioned in the first and third para-
g-ranhs. 
*Even if the release had not contained the last paragraph 
disclaiming any admission of negligence, neither it nor the 
settlement could be urged as an admission of liability under 
Section 31-1-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953): "Liability 1 
insurance--Settlement of claim nor admission of liability.~ 
settlement or partial settlement of a claim against any in:,.. 
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The final paragraph of the release re-emphasizes 
the purpose and intent of the settlement and expressly 
and positively disclaims and repudiates any possible 
inference of an admission of liability on the part of 
Berlant in the following language: 
"It is further understood and agreed that by 
the payment of said sum of money Gordon Ber-
lant does so by way of compromise of the claims 
and demands aforesaid and 1l'ithout prejitdice or 
admitting any liability therefor lJy himself or 
his sitccessors .. , (Emphasis added) (R. 2.:1) 
It ·would he extremely dif ficnl t to state more plainly 
that the settlement was to compromise a matter in dispute 
only and that no liability of any sort was admitted. Un-
less the latter provision must be altogethe.r stricken from 
the release by some heretofore unsuspected rule of law 
and the who1P tenor of the relPase altered and its intent 
corrupted, its plain, nnamb1gnous language is finally 
dispositive, not only of Defendant's defenses based on 
the relem..:e, bnt of Defendant's ronnterclaim as we-ill. 
In short, the release itself makes abundantly clear 
that in Pxecuting it McAllister agreed that no admission 
against Berlant's interest whatever clung to the settle-
ment made. This plain and unambiguous feature of the 
E;Pttllement and release, whether good, bad or indifferent, 
was acceptable to :McAllister, to Don Tibbs, his personal 
attorney, and to the judge who expressly approved it on 
~fav 1 G, 19Gfi. (R. 22) ¥ 
der a liability insurance policy shall be construed as an 
~ssion by either the insured or the insurer of liability of 
e insured with respect to any claims arising from the same 
Vent or set of facts whether the settlement is made by the 
sured, the insurer or any other person on behalf of the 
__sured or the insurer.'' 
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12 
Defendant did not explain to the court below why it 
should in effect strike the last paragraph of the release 
and force into or upon it an admission contrary to its 
terms, as though all parties drafting or approving it, in-
cluding the probate court, somehow acted incompetently 
or without authority or contrary to law. Perhaps De-
fendant will enlighten this Court in this regard. 
The general policy of the law is precisely the oppo-
site to Defendant's contentions and the re1sult below, as 
evidenced by the rule that offers of compromise and set-
tlement are generally inadmissible in evidence. 29 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 624, 629 and 632; Annot., 20 ALR 
2d 304. 
The subject release would clearly be inadmisible, 
even in any suit by Berlant's passengers against Mc-
Allister and Berlant. City Transportation C01npa1ny of 
Dallas v. Vasures, 278 S.W. 2d 373 (Tex. 1955). In the 
City case a passenger sued the taxi company in whose 
taxi she was riding and the owner and operator of the 
vehicle with which the taxi collided. The taxi company 
sought to introduce evidence of a settlement made with 
it by the insurer of the owner of the other vehicle which 
had acted unilaterally and without informing its insured. 
The court observed that even though payment of a claim 
in full can be offered as an admission against or of lia-
bility against the party paying the claim, payment by an 
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insurer obviously cannot be used as an admission of lia-
bility against an insured who has had nothing to do with 
the settlement. 
''Certainly, it cannot be said that actions taken 
"Without his knowledge or consent can constitute 
admissions against interest or of liability as to 
him." 278 S.W.2d at 375. 
The court further observed that since a party may 
explain why he paid a claim, this would hring the fact of 
the existence of insurance before the jury, which the law 
disfavors. It held that when the insurer paid the claim 
of the taxi company, it did so acting in its own interest 
and snch could not be used against the insured as an ad-
mission against interest or of liability. 
To the same effect is Jackson v. Clark, 351 S.vV.2d 
292 (Tex. 19Gl) where the insurer conducting its insured's 
defonsP had paid a third part~, in a three-car accident. 
Such conld not be shovYn as an admission against interest 
against the insured who had not participated in the settle-
mPnt. 
Berlant's policy, like other standard policies, g1ves 
or purports to giye the insurer discretion, whether or not 
to settlt' or tr>' claims. Consequently, an insurer's uni-
lateral settlement of a claim is irrelevant to a suit 
lH"onght h>' the insured for injuries suffered in the same 
aecident. 1Virdin,(f 'L'. Krisr71. 271 R.\.V.2d 458 (Tex. 1954). 
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In 6 BERRY, Law of Automobiles, § 623, cited in the 
TV ieding case, the rule is stated as follows: 
"The fact that the company's adjuster settled 
a claim made against the insured for damages to 
a machine which collided with the insured's ma-
chine, the accident being due to the fa ult of the 
claimant, does not bar insured from recovering 
from him for damages to his machine, insured 
having nothing to do with making the settlement, 
and being prohibited by the policy from inter-
fering therewith." 
However, counsel for Defendant's insurer and coun-
sel for Plaintiff's insurer both blandly presume (although 
they have yet to forthrightly argue) that insurance com-
panies are omniscient and infallible and would never 
settle unless their insured was very clearly legally liable 
and that the courts should therefore def er and adhere 
to the insurer's conclusions, binding all the world thereto. 
including objecting insureds, as a matter of law. Nothing 
whatever was cited to the lower court from the insurance 
code or otherwise endowing insurers with omniscience 
or otherwise justifying such a presumption. To the con-
trary, Plaintiff respectfull>- suggests that an insurer may 
well neglect adequately or properly to investigate an 
accident. Often a new investigator or adjuster will over-
look or fail to find obviously relevant data. Insurers are 
operated by fallible humans and an insurer may simply 
base a settlement on false facts or assumptions or in-
complete data or may even allow itself to be misled by 
the other party. 
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In view of the fact that the most believable evidence 
on hand, which comes from two lifetime residents of the 
small county where the Mowers resided, shows that the 
tortfeasor in the accident was the releasor, Grant Mower, 
and not Berlant, there appears ample reason for a court 
of equity to set the release aside as based on a gross 
fundamental mistake of underlying fact. Also the sum 
paid in settlement of McAllister's claims might have 
been procured by a misrepresentation of fact or other 
misconduct, so the settlement should be voided. See1 Vial-
let v. Consolidated Ry. & Power Co., 30 Utah 260, 84 
Pac. 496 (1906) and Kirchgestner v. Denver & R.G.TV.R. 
Co., 118 Utah 20, 218 P.2d 685 (1950), (rev'd on other 
grounds, 118 Utah 41, 233 P.2d 69G (1951) ). 
Instead of proceeding to set the settlement aside so 
as to recover its $5,150.00 as one would expect, Plaintiff's 
insurer has sided with the insurer representing Defend-
ant for reasons best known to itself. (See R. 79-81.) Per-
haps it is worth all of the $5,150.00 and more to Plain-
tiff's insurer to establish in Utah a rule as to settlements 
whereby hoth parties' claims are, automatically settled 
hy a small payment to one by an insurer, regardless of 
the> terms of the release taken. 
Regardless of this, for the reasons set forth above, 
the fact a settlement is made does not, and should not, 
logieally rarry any inexorable legal inf ere nee of legal 
fault on tlw part of tht> party making the settlement and 
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this is particularly true when the person actually making 
the settlement is someone besides the party actually in-
volved, i.e., the party's insurer. Schledewit.z v. Cousum-
ers Oil Cooprrativr, Inc., 357 P.2d 63 (Colo. 1960). 
In Schledewitz, a car driven by the son of the owner 
and in which the daughter of the owner was riding as a 
passenger collided \vith a semi-trailer and tractor truck 
owned by Consumers Oil Coop. Consumers settled the> 
claims the children might have for $1,600.00, which was 
paid with the approYal of the court, and a release was 
executed which stated it was not an admission of liability 
on the part of Consumers Oil. Consumers than s1wd the 
car owner for property damage and the owner sought 
to raise the release as a defense. The defense was strick-
en. The Colorado court noted that the release was limited 
by its terms to a release of Consumers' potential liability 
to the children and did not admit liability. There was no 
release of any rights Consumers had against the owner. 
"[\VJ hat then could be the basis for holding 
that the release in question amounts to a defense 
in the instant action? No mental gymnastics vv:ill 
servt> to expand its terms and provisions to the 
extent that it conld be considered a release h.v 
Consumers of its right to recover for damages to 
its property, the only release being that of the 
children to sue for damages for pe.rsonal injuries. 
If this instrument be deemed such that it may he 
pled as a bar to the instant action, such a status 
must be based upon some ground other than an 
actual 'release' as disclosed hy the terms of the 
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instrument. The only such ground, and that ether-
eal, is a possible contention that the release 
amounts to an admission by Consumers of facts 
which would affirmatively establish the defense 
of contributory negligence. VV e are not impressed 
with such a contention. 
• • • 
"We cannot agree with the general premise 
that any release amounts to an admission of negli-
gence, thereby precluding the party accepting the 
release from bringing an action to recover his 
damages. 
"The better view is that the acceptance or 
procurement of a release is not an admission by 
the releasee of liability on his part .... 
"It is to be noted that the release here con-
tains the language 'It is further understood and 
agreed that this settlement is the compromise of 
a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the pay-
ment of said sum is not to be construed as an ad-
mission of liability on the part of the said Con-
sumers Oil Company, by whom liability is ex-
pressly denied.' It would indeed be difficult to con-
strue this language as an admission of liability. 
At best, it might be classified as a manifestation 
of awareness that potential liability might exist. 
As such, it should be classified with other offers 
of compromise as inadmissible evidence." 357 
P.2d 63 at 66-67. 
T1w subject release is, in all respects, the same as the 
release d12alt with in SchledPwitz. It does not carry any 
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admission of negligence at all, let alone one usable against 
Berlant, particularly in view of its last paragraph which 
expressly negates any such admission. The lower court 
clearly gave the release a wholly improper effect in dis-
regard of law and its plain terms and must lw reversed. 
B. The Release is Unilateral and Not illittual; and 
TVhile It Releases JJ1cAllister's Claims Against Berlant, 
It Does Not Release Berlant's Claims Against JJlcAllister. 
The release says nothing whatever about Berlant's 
claims against McAllist(>T, but only refers to McAllister's 
claims against Berlant. It simply provides that McAllis-
ter's claims against Berlant are relinquished for $5,150.00 
and nothing more. McAllister did not exact, nor did 
Berlant's insurer purport to grant, any equivalent re-
linquishment of Berlant's claims. 
Such a unilateral release should be enforced accord-
ing to its terms and should not be extended into a mutual 
release by operation of lmv. Brazell Bros. Contractors 
v. Hill, 138 S.E. 2d 835 (S.C. 1954). In Brazell the 
Brazell Brothers, a partnership, sued Hill for damage to 
a truck. Hill denied negligence and filed a counterclaim. 
Brazell's insurer then settled with Hill for $475.00 and 
procured a release discharging Brazells from all Hill's 
claims. Hill alone signed the release which provided that 
the payment made on behalf of Brazell Brothers was not 
an admission of liability. Hill's counterclaim was then 
dismissed. Counsel for Hill then sought leave to amend 
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Hill's answer to claim the settlement and release was an 
overall accord and satisfaction between the parties so 
that Brazells' complaint should be dismissed. The trial 
conrt refused to allow the amendment, holding it insuffi-
cient to constitri_te a defense in light of the undisputed 
facts. On appeal Hill contended Brazell had ratified the 
release and this constituted ratification of the compro-
misf' and an accord and satisfaction. 
The court observed: 
"The written release is the sole evidence of 
the terms of the compromise and settlement be-
tween Hill and the carrier. No attempt whatever 
has been made to vary, enlarge or contradict its 
terms, which are clear and unambiguous. It would 
he useless to quote it or further expound its provi-
sions. It is a classic example of a unilateral con-
tract; a promise by Hill only, the consideration on 
the other side being executed hy the payment of a 
snrn of money." 
Procr'eding to its holding, the court further stated: 
"The release here evidences ... the relinquish-
ment of a claim by one party in consideration of a 
payment by the other. With an action for damages 
pending against him in which he had filed a coun-
terclaim, Hill simply released his claim for dam-
ages ·withont exacting in return an acquittal from 
thE' claims asserted against him. The ratification 
of the compromise and settlement by the Brazells 
ram10t raisr a promisr on thrir part to forego 
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something which the carrier did not renounce for 
them. In short, there was no attempted compro-
mise and settlement of the Brazells' claim by the 
carrier to 'vhich they could be bound by ratifica-
tion" 138 S.E. 2d at 837-838. 
The lower court, in effect, provided McAllister with 
a release of Berlant's claims - something McAllister 
and his counsel and the probate court did not see fit to 
require in the first place and which, as is pointed out in 
more detail below, Berlant's insurer had no authority 
whatever to give and for which McAllister paid nothing, 
all without Berlant's consent. It erred in so doing as 
shown by the Bra.zel case, sitpra, and should be reversed. 
C. Berlant's Insurer Has No Authority To Release 
Berlant's Claims Agai•nst McAllister. 
Assuming, contrary to the actual facts and for pur-
pose of argument only, that Berlant's insurer did purport 
to contribute Berlant's claims along with the $5,150.00 
cash to the McAllister seittlement, the legal question of 
the insurer's authority to do so would remain. Although 
the policy is not in the record, it is a standard printed 
form of liability policy which contains all the usual pro-
visions. At least there has been no contention to date 
that it is otherwise. 
Now here does the policy state that the company will 
represent or has the authority to represent or be agent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~1 
for the insured in making or releasing the insured's O\Vn 
claims against third parties responsible foT injuries suf-
fered by the insured. This is simply not the insurer's 
business. 
An insurance company has three basic duties under 
its policy recognized and enforced by the law, none of 
which involve it in its insured's own claims against others. 
These duties are: ( 1) to pay the sums for covered claims 
its insured is legally obligated to pay; (2) to defend 
suits against the insured ; and ( 3) to investigate claims 
properly and otherwise represent the interests of its in-
sured in good faith. Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 
G41 (E.D. Pa. 1966). The requirement of good faith ap-
plies to all of these duties. See State Aidomobile J,ns. 
Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939); Traders & 
General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 
(10th Cir. 1942); American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. 
Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1958) and Ivy v. 
Pacific Aidomobile Insurance Company, 320 P.2d 140 
(Cal. 1058). 
Contributing the insured's own claims to a settlement 
without his consent and over his objection is the very anti-
thesis of the foregoing duties of an insurer and far beyond 
the scope of its authority. Fikes v. Johnson, 248 S."\V. 2d 
362 (Ark. 1952); H1lrley v. McMillan, 268 S.W.2d 229 
(Tex. 1954); Burnham v. Williams, 194 S.W. 751 (Mo. 
1917); Radosevich v. Pegues, 292 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1956) 
and FmtfJht v. Tf!asham, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959). 
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In Hurley v. McJYiillwn the defendant sought to prove 
that plaintiff's insure,r had settled the damages def end-
ant claimed resulted from plaintiff's negligence. Such 
was not permitted. 
"It is manifest that an insurance company, if 
it admits that its insured is liable, without its in-
sured's knowledge or consent, is acting in its own 
interest, and not as agent of the insured. The in-
surer cannot bar its insured's right to recover 
$24,000 damages for injuries received in the col-
lision, by settling the claim of the other party to 
the collision for $1,325." 268 S.W.2d at 234. 
In Bitrnham v. Wiliams, supra, the plaintiff informed 
his insurer of the facts of the collision and tl1at plaintiff 
was not liable. The defendant proceeded with a claim 
for $5,000.00 which plaintiff's insurer settled for $200.00, 
procuring a release which Tffovided no admission of lia-
bility was made. Plaintiff was unaware of such settle-
ment until afterwards. Defendant sought to set up the 
settlement in bar of plaintiff's suit. The court held de-
fendant's contentions that contributory negligence was 
an absolute defense and that compromises are favored 
and that the act of agent binds principal were irrelevant 
and that sole question was whether the insurance com-
pany "was acting as an agent for the plaintiff in the 
capacity of settling a damage claim which he might have 
against the defendant." 194 S.W. at 752. The policy con-
tained all the usual provisions, including obligations of 
the insurer to indemnify the insured against property 
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damage and injuries from accidents caused by the owner-
ship or use of the insured automobile and to investigate 
accidents, negotiate and settle claims and defend suits. 
The policy contained the usual language· obligating the 
insured not to assume liability or interfere with negotia-
tions for settlement, but to secure evidence and to aid 
and cooperate. 
''As we understand such a contract, it is one 
where, being properly notified of an accident or 
damage covered by the policy, the insurance com-
pan~' agrees to step into the assured's shoes so 
far as handling the claim or effecting settlement 
or defending suits is conce:rned, and that attititde 
that it reqit.ires an assitred to take when a claim 
is nwde against him is rather one of age•nt to the 
company than a principal far whom the company 
is acting. Besides, the contra.ct is to handle only 
such business as is brought agavnst the assured 
o 11d 11one of the provi8io·ns of the policy can be 
co nst riied as giving t7ir insitrance company power 
to srttle a·ny claims u·hfrh the assured may luwe 
n.rJninst some third party." (Emphasis added) 194 
S:\V. at 753. 
The court vigorously repudiated the contention the 
setth•ment by tlw insurer necessarily and conclusively 
(If•termined whose negligence proximately caused the 
<lamage, was res jndicata of that issue and determined 
the liability of the insured, and held it had no effect to 
hind or Pstop the plaintiff from asserting his claim for 
dama,g-es arising out of the c>ollision. 
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In Radosevich v. Pegues, 133 Colo. 148, 292 P.2d 741 
(1956), the Pegues sued Radosevich and Radose,·ich in-
surer's attorney filed an answer and counterclaim. Set-
tlement negotiations followed and finally Radosevich's 
insurer paid Pegues $1,500.00 and obtained a release in 
favor of Radosevich. Radosevich did not participate in 
the settlement. The release excluded a subrogation claim 
of Radosevich's insurer and provided it was made: in com-
promise of a dispute and vvas not an admission of liability. 
The parties did not act to release Radosevich's counter-
claim and his attorney stated he had no authority to dis-
miss or settle the counterclaim. The Pegues were told 
their acceptance of the settlement money and their execu-
tion of the release did not affect Radosevich's counter-
claim. Nevertheless, the trial court dismissed the counter-
claim, holding the settlement was to be treated as a com-
promise of the whole action. 
The Colorado Supreme Court held the question was 
whether Radosevich's attorney had authority to compro-
mise his counterclaim without his knowledge or consent. 
The answer was no because an attorney must have ex-
press authority to settle or compromise his client's claim. 
"It would be strange logic indeed to hold that 
though a lawyer definitely intended no to com-
promise his client's cause, yet the law would imply 
an intent to do the very thing which it holds he 
was without powe·r to do, and would vvork a result 
exactly opposite to that which was intended." 
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The court remanded the case for trial on the counter-
claim. 
It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange had no authority to settle Ber-
lant's claim and that, even if Farmers had attempted to do 
so, Berlant would not be prejudiced in maintainng his 
claim. 
D. Even If Bcrlant's Insurer Had Purported To 
Rclfase Berla11t's Claim in Settling With Mc.Allister, 
Such Action TV as Not .Adopted or Ratified by Berlant and 
Does Not Bi11d Berl ant. 
The record is clear that after learning of the settle-
ment, Berlant objected to his insurer for making it. 
Appelle·e nonetheless argued below that the reply 
filed by Farmers in Berlant's name which plead the re-
ease as a defense constituted ratification of the release 
which Appellee wrongly assumes included a discharge of 
Berlant's rights. This contention was properly answered 
in Bra.zPll Bros. Contractors v. Hill, 138 S.E.2d 835 (S.C. 
1964), discussed above1, and in Faught v. Wa.sham, 329 
S.\V.2d 588 (Mo. 1959). Although the court making the 
latter decision mistakenly assumed the ratification rule 
was applicable, it went on to hold, and properly so, that 
ratification requires that the· principal first have actual 
kno\vledge of the unauthorized act of its agent and, sec-
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ond, have an actual intent to adopt or ratify it. Both of 
these elements were lacking there, as in the instant case, 
because the reply raising the release as a defense to the 
counterclaim was filed by the plaintiff's insurer without 
plaintiff's knowledge or participation. Faught v. Washam 
also held that there was no reason why the insurer should 
not plead the release because the insurer's economic inter-
est was at stake and was properly to be defended. 
The release in the instant case did not give away 
Berlant's claims in the first place and there was no other 
such action which could have been ratified by pleading 
the release or any other matter in Berlant's reply. The 
doctrine of ratification is simply irrelevant. 
However, since Berlant did not know about or par-
ticipate in the reply contended to constitute ratification 
by him, the whole foundation for any supposed adoption 
or ratification is missing as demonstrated by Faught v. 
Was ham, supra. 
Appellee may urge the reply pleading the release 
was a waiver by Bedant of Berlant's claims against Mc-
Allister, but any such contention must also fail because 
of two of the four essential requisites for waive'r are 
lacking. The four requisites are: (1) an existing right 
benefit or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; (3) 
an intent to relinquish it; and (4) relinquishment of the 
right by a distinct act. American Sav. & Loan Assn. v. 
Blomq1tist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968). Berlant had 
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no intent to relinquish his claim, but the opposite intent, 
and he did nothing to relinquish it. The only claim waived 
or relinquished was that of McAllister, and Berlant's in-
surer had the duty to defend against it and every right 
to plead the release taken as a bar to its prosecution. 
I-D. The Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction Does 
Not Apply To Bar Berlant's Claim Against ·McAllister. 
The burden of proving an accord and satisfaction is 
on he who asserts it. Lenchitsky v. H. J. Sandberg Co., 
343 P.2d 523 (Ore. 1959) and Clay v. Rossi, 108 P.2d 506 
(Idaho 19±0). 
Appellee has aserted the release was an accord and 
satisfaction as to Berlant's claims, even though the only 
claim satisfied under the plain terms of the release was 
that of McAllister. The, elements of an accord and satis-
faction as to Berlant's claims were not shown by Appellee 
to exist. These are: (1) a meeting of the minds and an 
intent to satisfy the particular obligation in question, and 
(2) consideration. Barton v. lV c.lker, 341P.2d1037 (Kan. 
1959); Bellingham Secitrities Syndicate v. Bellingham 
Coal lllines, 125 P.2d 668 (\Vash. 1942) and Weaver v. 
Williams, 317 P.2d 1108 (Ore'. 1957). 
Berlant's mind could hardly hav<~ met with McAllis-
kr's when he was denied participation in the settlement 
negotiations. Further, he received no consideration for 
an~· pnrported sabsfaction of his claim. 
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Additionally, an accord and satisfaction is voidable 
where one party labors nnder a fundamental mistake and 
there is a complete difference between what he supposed 
he "·as reeeiving or giving and what was, in fact, re-
c0ived or givPn. Jfrtropolitan State Bank 1.:. Co1', 302 P.2d 
188 (Colo. 195G). 
Under the plain terms of the settlement, all that Ber-
ln.nt gan' up was mmwy (through his insurer) for which 
lw n'rPivl'd a rPlease of )fr~\llister's claims. If he actually 
also gav0 up his elaims against ~Ic~-\llister, he did so only 
eonstn1etiYt'ly through his insurer. This was a funda-
nwntal mistakl' since there was a complete difference be-
twt>Pn what ht' would han' supposed he was gi'ing up 
nnd whnt Appellet' eonh'nds lH' gave up. If an accord and 
satist'aetion was necomplislwd. it must therefore he ,-oided 
and sl't asidl' to pren'nt its working a gross injustice. 
F. The Dod ri11t' of Pr,l1n i,,,_,or_11 E :<fop pt'! D'. t .:< S1A 
App! ,11 T<) R<1r Rt'rla11f",, C!aim -1.aniil,f JfrAlli~'ttr. 
Tlw hurdt'll t)t' pn)ving- an estl•ppd is L)n the party 
asst'rting it. This dt't°t'llSt' is iwt t'asily slwwn and will rwt 
ht' ht1 ld sust~1int'd by infrrt'lll't'. ::::.t<l~t i'. Clit1r,'f,>1i. -!~)L) P.~li 
~l77 \ \Y ash. l ~lti7). but t)nly ii sul1st~rnti:1 ~t'tt in en)ry 
partit·ul:lr. N<'<zr Cr,, k C, 1 , , •• Jcu;:c ·'· ~;1~ r',::\i. ~:.::.:~ . l'~:~. 
l ~);):n. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
vVhile Appellee did not clarify below the nature of 
tilt> estoppel claimed by him to exist, it would appear that 
lie claimed something in th(' nature of promissory estop-
pt'l. 
This doctrine requires: ( 1) full avmreness of the 
facts; (2) full awareness of the promise made; (3) knowl-
Pdge of reliance of the promisee on the promise; (4) a 
loss resulting from such re-liance. Only when all these. ele-
nwnts are present will the law pn•vent withdrawal of the 
promise. Union Ta11k Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 
101, ;)87 P.2d 1000 (1964). 
Not a single one of these elements is present in the 
instant case. Berlant made no promise to release his 
claims or not to sue; he was unaware of ·what his insurer 
may han-- done to raise such a promise; McAllister does 
not evPn claim he relied on any promise not to sue, and 
McAllistPr has suffered no loss. 
Notlling more than some uncertainty in the promise 
reasonahl:' putting the prornisP(\ on inquiry, which ho 
fails to mak(•, prevents application of tlH• dodrirn•. Petty 
v. Gindy Jlfq. Corp., 17 Utah 2<122, 404 P.2d :m (19Gfi). 
ln short, no f~stoppel was or <~fntld po:-;sihly have been 
raisPd h:·» tlH~ snhjr·d :-;dtl<·rn<~nt an<l App<•ll<'(~':-; fif'th 
drfrns<• assf·rting- <·stopywl sl1011l<l hav(~ lH·<~n strick<•n 
nnclPr TinlP 12(f), rtal1 Tfol<~:-; of' Civil l'rol'Pd11n·. 
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POINT II 
IF THE RELEASE OF MCALLISTER'S CLAIM AGAINST 
BERLANT OBTAINED BY BERLANT'S INSURER WILL 
BAR BERLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST MCALLISTER IF RE-
LIED ON BY BERLANT IN DEFENSE OF MCALLISTER'S 
COUNTERCLAIM, BERLANT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO 
AMEND THE REPLY FILED ON HIS BEHALF BY HIS 
INSURER TO DISAFFIRM SUCH RELEASE. 
Should it be determined that Berlant will lose his 
right to proceed against McAllister if he relies on the 
release filed by his insurer in defense of McAllister's 
counterclaim, then the case should be remanded so that 
Plaintiff, who now has independent counsel, can amend 
the reply on file and disaffirm the release. Berlant's mo-
tion for permission to do so (R. 66) was never acted on 
by the trial court except insofar as a denial of the mo-
tion is implicit in the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 
complaint. The record is c.lear that Plaintiff's insurer 
both obtained and plead the release vvithout Be'Tlant's 
knowledge or participation. As a minimum, Berlant has 
the right to disavow the release so as to preserve his 
own claims. 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires." Since the instant case has not proceeded past the 
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pkading stage, the greatest liberality should be exercised 
in allowing amendments. See Johnson v. Peck, 90 Utah 
544, 63 P. 2d 251 (1936). Under the circumstances the 
trial court's implicit denial of Plaintiff's motion to amend 
·was a clear abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The below court improperly entered summary judg-
nwnt against Plaintiff for the following reasons: 
1. The subject release did not constitute an admis-
sion of negligence or liability on the part of Berlant, but 
expressly negatived any such possible inference. 
2. The release did not purport to release Plaintiff's 
claims against Defendant, but only Defendant's claims 
against Plaintiff. 
3. The law should not import mutuality into a freely 
contracted, unilateral settlement and release by ope.ration 
of law, particularly one previously approved by the re-
leasor's attorney and by a court. 
4. The release was effected by Plaintiff's insurer 
·without Plaintiff's knowledge, acquiescence or participa-
tion; and Plaintiff's insurer was without authority to 
relrnse, S<3 ttle or discharge Plaintiff's claims in connection 
tlierewi th. 
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5. If Plaintiff's insurer had purported to release 
Plaintiff's claims, such action was never adopted, ratified 
or approved by Plaintiff, but, on the contrary, was ex-
pressly disapproved by him. 
6. The subject settlement and release constituted 
neither an accord and satisfaction as to Berlant's claims, 
nor the basis of a promissory estoppel since under the 
facts the essential elements of both of these doctrines are 
lacking. 
Should the legal effect of pleading the release in 
Paintiff's reply be as Defendant contends, the case should 
be remanded and Plaintiff allowed to amend the reply 
since it was filed by his insurer without his knowledge or 
consent. 
This Court should reverse the summary judgment 
and remand the case for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur IL Nielsen 
David S. Cook 
NIELSEN, CONDER, 
HANSEN AND HENRIOD 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
and 
Udell R. Jens en 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
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